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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FRITO-LAY and/or TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY.

:
:

Appellant/Petitioner.

:

vs.

:

Case No. 20061053 - CA

:

Labor Commission No. 2003892

:

Priority 7

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION and
AMY C. CLAUSING,
Appellees/Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AMY C. CLAUSING (EMPLOYEE)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT REGARDING
RULE 24, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The Utah Supreme Court has endeavored on numerous occasions to emphasize to
counsel the importance of professionalism and civility in the practice of law and has adopted
Rule 24 (k), Ut. R. Civ. P. which provides that "[a]U briefs under this rule must be . . . free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters." As that Court recently
noted1, the term "scandalous" includes statements which are defamatoiy and offensive to
propriety.
As the Court will note, in numerous locations throughout Employer's Brief, such
scandalous statements are most inappropriate!}' directed at Employee and. more particularly,
at Employee's counsel, K. Dawn Atkin. The most offensive of those statements involve
'Peters v.Pine Meadow Ranch Home Association, 2007 UT 2,4 (Utah. Jan. 12,2007)

Employer's personal attacks against Ms. Atkin asserting that she violated Rule 3.1 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct because:
She knows that her interpretation of the Order , if followed, would make the
Order contrary to the evidence and the law. She is knowingly misusing
ambiguous language, and thereby, abusing legal procedure.2
The record does not support those scandalous accusations. They are false and were
made with either actual knowledge, or with reckless disregard, of that falsity. Either way,
such statements set forth in Employer's Brief constitute a serious violation of the provisions
o f Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and should be appropriately addressed by this
Court.
JURISDICTION
As reflected in Employer's Docketing Statement, the Judgment or Order appealed
from is the Order of the Commission dated October 24,2006. That Order of the Commission
dismissed Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion and struck the March 17, 2006 decision of Judge
Sessions in which he decided the merits of that Motion against Employer. As that Order
reflects, it neither addressed nor affected the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

of Judge Sessions dated September 23, 2005, as to which the Employer had not filed any
timely Request for Review, and which had become final on October 24, 2005.

Employer's Brief, p. 16

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal from the October 23, 2006" Order oi the
Appeals Board of the Labor Commission, pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-801 (8)
(2003). §63-46b-16 (1998). and §78-2a-3 (2) (a).
With respect, however, this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether
Judge Sessions* abused his discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) Motion. That issue must be
addressed in the first instance b) the Labor Commission. In the event the Court determines
the Commission committed reversible error in determining that Rule 60(b) had no application
to this proceeding and mat such error was prejudicial to the Employer, the Court should
appropriately remand the matter to the Commission for its review and determination of
whether Judge Sessions abused his discretion in denying the Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion.
Neither does this Court have jurisdiction over any purported appeal from the Findings
of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Order of Judge Sessions dated September 23. 2005. as to
which the Employer failed to file a timel} Request for Review, a statutory prerequisite to
judicial review.4

'Order Dismissing Respondents* Rule 60(b) Motion. R. 460
4

Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-801 (8)(c) ["A part}7 claiming to be aggrieved ma} seek
judicial review7 onl> if the part} has exhausted the parties remedies before the commission
as provided by this section."]

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
As previously reflected in the Employee's Motion for Summary Disposition, the sole
issue on this appeal is whether the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission committed
reversible error in its Order dated October 23, 2006, which dismissed Employer's Motion
pursuant to Rule 60 (b), Ut. R. Civ. P., declaring that Rule was not cognizable in this
workers' compensation proceeding. The remaining "Issues" outlined in Petitioner's Brief
are not properly before this Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review varies in this matter, depending upon which of the various
issues set forth in Employer's Brief is being considered. Matters of statutory construction
are questions of law that are generally reviewed for correctness."6 However, when reviewing
the Commission's interpretation of its own rules, the Court applies "an intermediate standard
of review, deferring to an agency's interpretation as long as it is both reasonable and
rational."7
The standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact has been summarized as
follows:
In this case, the Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to
determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before it.
See Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997) . . . As such, we must uphold the
Employer's Brief, p. 1
6

Esquivel v. Labor Comm % 2000 UT 66, 7 P. 3d 777 (Utah, 2000).

1

Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App. 401, 122 P. 3d
700, 703 (Utah App., 2005).
-4-

Commission's determination ... unless the determination exceeds the bounds
of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion
under 63-46b-l 6(h )(i) of the UAPA. . .. Moreover, we resolve. ~*[a]n) doubt
respecting the right of compensation in favor of the injured employee/ "Drake
v Industrial Comm >?. 939 P. 2d 177. 182 (Utah, 1997)(citation omitted).s
There do not appear to have been am reviews of a denial of a Rule 60(b) Motion from
the Labor Commission. However, this Court has previous])' recognized that such a denial
b) a trial court will be reversed onh when an "abuse of discretion" has been established.4
That the same standard should be applicable to an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b)
determination made b) the Labor Commission.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-801 (2006) provides the basic statutor) requirement for
timel) filing of Motions for Review7. It provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an administrative law
judge in accordance with Subsection (3). the decision of an administrative law
judge on an application for hearing filed under Subsection (1) is a final order
of the commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued. The
commission, the commissioner, an administrative law7 judge, or the appeals
Board, is not bound by the usual common lavs or statutor) rules of evidence,
or b) an)7 technical or statutor) rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal
rules or procedure, other than as provided in this section or as adopted by the
commission * * *
(3) (a) A party in interest may appeal the decision of an administrative law
judge b) filing a motion for review with the Division of Adjudication within
30 days of the date the decision is issued.
h

AE Clevile v. Labor Comm n, 996 P. 2d 1072, 1074 (Utah App.. 2000), cert den.
4 P. 3d 1289 (Utah. 2000).
"Jensen v. Foote. 2005 UT App. 156. % 20 (Utah App.. 2005); Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 393 Ut. Adv. Rep. 23. 2000 UT App. 110. ^j 9 (Utah App.. 2000)
-5-

(8) (c) A party7 claiming to be aggrieved may seek judicial review only if the
party has exhausted the party's remedies before the commission as provided
by this section.
Similarly Administrative Rule R602-2-l(M) provides for review of Orders by
Administrative Law Judges and specifies that such review must be requested within thirty
days in accordance with the Motion for Review provisions of Utah Code Anno. §§63-46b-12
and 34A-1-303 (1997).
Utah Code Anno., §34A-l-304 (1) (a) (1997) provides that the Commission "shall
make rules governing administrative procedures." Subsection (b) further specifies, "the
rules made under this section are not required to conform to common law or statutory rules
of evidence or other technical rules of procedure." In accordance with those provisions,
Administrative Rule R602-2-1, as adopted by the Labor Commission, provides for only
limited incorporation of the Ut. R. Civ. P. It does not adopt Rule 60(b).10
Rule 60 (b), Ut. R. Civ. P. provides, in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect. . . . A motion under this Subdivision (b) does
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.

,0

R602-2-l (F)(4) [Depositions pursuant to Ut. R. Civ. P.; R602-2-KFW) [sanctions
under Rule 3 7]; R602-2-1 (G) [Subpoenas served as provided in Ut.R.Civ.P.; and R602-2-1
(N) ["generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery and the
issuance of Subpoenas"].
-6-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Administrative Law Judge. Dale W. Sessions, entered Amended Findings of Fact.
Conclusions of Law, and Order to Correct Benefit Computation Omission on September 23.
2005. In that Order. Judge Sessions determined Employee had met the burdens of both legal
and medical cause, that she was injured while working for Employer on March 18.1999. and
that she did not reach medical stability until June 10. 2004. The Order further declared that
Employee w7as. therefore, entitled to workers compensation benefits related to her injury. In
addition to entering an award for the medical expenses and permanent partial disability
benefits, the Order of Judge Sessions incorporated the medical panel report and Stipulation
of the parties by reference and Ordered, in pertinent part:
9. Petitioner is awrarded temporary total disability compensation from March
18. 1999 to June 10. 2004. The applicable computation rate is $487.00 per
week; and
14. Respondent is permitted an offset for amounts previously paid by
Respondent(s) in all areas of this award.11
That Order embodied a significant judicial error in that it awarded the maximum
temporary total disabilit) benefits at the rate of $487.00 per week for the entire period from
the date of injur} on March 18, 1999 through the date she reached medical stability on June
10, 2004.12 While Employee wras entitled to disability7 benefits for that entire period, those
"Amended Finding of Facts. Conclusions of Law and Order to Correct Benefit
Computation Omission of Judge Sessions dated September 23, 2005. R. 151 - 153
12

Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-410 (1999) [(l)(a) In case of temporary disability7, so long
as the disability is total the employee shall receive 66 2/3% of that employee's average
-7-

benefits should have been divided between temporary total disability while she was off work,
based upon the full $487.00 per week maximum, and temporary partial disability taking into
consideration those weeks, and the earnings she received, while engaged in light duty work.13
Since that outcome was contemplated by the parties, those periods of light duty work, and
the amounts earned, were fully set forth in paragraph 12 of the Stipulation of the parties,14
which was incorporated in that Order.
Paragraph 12 set forth each of the various dates during which Employee had been able
to perform light duty work, together with the various weekly amounts she was able to earn
during those periods. That paragraph concluded by noting that the Stipulation was entered
into on September 15, 2004 and that 'Temporary total or temporary partial disability
thereafter will need to be addressed at a later date. ,,b
After Judge Sessions issued his Order on September 23, 2005, Employer failed to
timely file a Motion for Review to appeal that Order. Employer also failed to pay the
benefits awarded to Employee under the terms of that Order, or any part of those benefits.

weekly wages at the time of the injury but: (i) not more than a maximum of 100% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week."]
13

Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-411 (1999) ["(1) If the injury causes temporary partial
disability for work, the employee shall receive weekly compensation equal to: (a) 66 2/3%
of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the accident and the
weekly wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but not more than 100% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury (plus $5.00 for each of her two dependent
children)]
Stipulation of Facts and Proposed Medical Panel Questions, R. 105 at 109
]S

Id.

-8-

On December 20. 2005. Employee finally requested the Commission 10 issue an
Abstract of the Award in order to enforce the award against Employer.16
On December 21. 2005. Employer filed a "Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from
Judgment/'17 asking Judge Sessions to set aside his award. Judge Sessions considered
Employer's allegations, together with the factual background of the case and Employer's
actions. On March 17, 2006. Judge Sessions entered his Order denying Employer's Rule
60(b) Motion.18 That Order found that Employer's assertions were "'not indicative of
mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect"19 and that. "It would be unjust to set the
amended order aside under the facts of this case."20
Employer then filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the Labor
Commission to review Judge Sessions Order denying Employer's Rule 60(b) Relief21
On October 23. 2006. the Appeals Board issued its Order Dismissing Respondent's
Rule 60(b) Motion22 and this Appeal followed.

16

R. 155

17

R. 163

18

Amended Order Denying Rule 60(b) Motion Filed by Respondent and Denying
Reconsideration of the Order. R. 334
]is

Id. at 335

2{]

Id.

21

R. 338

22

Supra, note 3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In its Brief, Employer has failed to set forth various portions of the facts which are
relevant and material to this action, but which fail to support its assertions. Employer has set
forth other asserted facts based upon its own interpretations of those facts rather than the
facts themselves. Employee has, therefore, addressed its Statement of Facts to reflect the
relevant and material facts of this case, as reflected by the record.
1. The underlying Order of Judge Sessions23 awarded Employee temporary total
disability benefits for the entire period from the date of her work related injury on March 18,
1999, through the date she reached medical stability on June 10,2004, at the rate of $487.00
per week24, which is a total of $126,814.34 (after deduction of the $6,136.60 previously
paid). When combined with the applicable interest at 8% per annum from the dates those
payments were due through December 15,2005 of $56,747.51, that brought the total amount
of the award to $183?561.85.25
2. That Order embodied a significant judicial error in that failed to apply appropriate
adjustments to the temporary disability award for the various times between March 18, 1999
to June 10, 2004, when Employee was earning a lesser income performing light duty work,

23

Supra, note 11

24

Id., Supra, note 3

^Computations accompanying letter from K. Dawn Atkin to Mr. Kanell dated
December 1, 2005, R. 214. See also computations accompanying proposed Abstract of
Award and computations forwarded to Judge Sessions dated December 20, 2005, R. 155
-10-

in accordance w ith paragraph 12 ofthe Stipulaiion which was incorporated into that Order.20
3. As reflected in that Stipulation. Employee was not able to earn the $900.00 per
week she was previoush earning during that period from March 18. 1999 to June 10.2004.27
However, she was able to work in a light duty capacit) during various times, and with
various earnings, during that period. Paragraph 12 ofthe Stipulation specified:
"Petitioner continued to work for Frilo-la) in a light duty capacity from
3/18'99 to 5/17/99 earning $400.00 per week. However, she was unable to
perform her duties with Frito-La) and the employment ended. Thereafter,
petitioner continued to work in a light duty capacit) as follows:
5/8/99 petitioner started working for Orbit earning $11.48/hr:
5/8/99 to 12/29/99 restricted to 20hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk
12/30/99 to 1/10/00 (1st knee surgery) Unable to work.
1/11/00 to 2/28/00 40 hrs/week. Earned $456.00/wk
2/29/00 to 4/30/00 restricted to 20 hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk.
5/1/00 to 5/20/00 40 hrs/week $456.00 wk
5/21/00 to 5/30/00 (1st elbow surgery) Unable to work.
5/31/00 to 6/21/00 40 hrs/week $456.00/wk
6/22/00 to 6/28/00 (2nd elbow surgery) Unable to work.
6/29/00 to 8/16/00 40 hrs/week "$456.00/wk
8/17/00 to 9/11/00 (2nd knee surgery) Unable to work.
9/12/00 to 10/2/00 restricted to 20 hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk
10/3/00 to 4/4/02 40 hours/week $456.00/wk
4/5/02 to 4/18/02 (3rd knee surgery - hardware removal) Unable to work.
4/19/02 to 5/30/02 restricted to 20 hrs/wk. Earned $228/wk
5/31/02 to 10/19/02 40 hrs/week $456.00 wk
10/20/02 changed jobs to ISG earning $12.48/hr
10/20/02 to 5/5/03 40 hrs/week $499.20/wk
5/5/03 Laid off from 1SG
5/5/03 to 3/1/04 no work
3/1/04 Began working at Pacific Rim earning $12.00/hr
1/04 (sic) to 6/25/04 40 hrs/week $480/wk
5/25/04 (sic) laid off from Pacific Rim"
2b

Supra. note 14 at ^[12

27

M.atTi3
11 _

Paragraph 12 of that Stipulation went on to specify, aThe parties created this
stipulation on September 15,2004. Temporary total or temporary partial disability thereafter
will need to be addressed at a later date."
4. Employee submitted her pre-hearing disclosures28 prior to that Stipulation. In it,
she specified that Employee was seeking, among other benefits, temporary total disability,
temporary partial disability, and further permanent partial disability benefits. Employee also
stated, at paragraph 9 (c): wCWe believe that the full payment of TTD and TPD was not paid
after the various knee surgeries. However, there does not seem to be any dispute regarding
the dates and we hope to have this issue resolved before the hearing."29
5. The parties were able to resolve the dispute regarding those dates prior to the
scheduled hearing, as reflected at paragraph 12 of their Stipulation, as previously referenced.
6. In accordance with the Stipulation, the matter was subsequently submitted to a
Medical Panel. The Medical Panel Report was returned and properly forwarded to all parties
on August 19,2005. In that Report, the Panel responded to the AL J's questions, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(1) Is there a medically demonstrable causal connection between the
petitioner's current medical condition and the alleged incident which occurred
on or about 21 May, 2000?
A. With regard to the right knee, it appears that the aggravation from
the above accident is legitimate and the petitioner is stable at this time, albeit
it is anticipated she will have recurrent episodes and may require further
treatment.
28

R. 375

29
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B. The lew back condition appears to be ongoing and appears to be a
permanent aggravation of a pre-existing condition from the industrial accident
ofl 8 March. 1999. * * *
(2) When did the petitioner's Condition stabilize as a result of the
incident on or about 21 Ma). 2000?
We feel that the petitioner stabilized when Dr. Morgan indicated on 10
June 2004 that he had nothing else to offer and her condition had not
changed.30
7. Employer filed an Objection to thai Medical Panel Report.31 but failed to file it
within the time period required.

Counsel for Employee proper!) submitted a written

Response to that Objection.32 Judge Sessions thereafter rejected Employer's Objection as
untimely, rendering it unnecessary for him to consider Employee's Response.33
8. Although Judge Sessions did not consider Employee's Response, it was.
nevertheless, fonvarded to Employer's Counsel as reflected in that Response.34 prior to the
Judge's rejection of Employer's Objection. In that Response, Employee explained:
Finally, I must admit to being confused by respondents claim of a
stipulated stabilization date. The current Stipulation of Facts and Proposed
Medical Panel Questions includes a complete outline of petitioner's income
from 1999 to 2004 so that Temporary Partial Disability could be calculated if
petitioner was found not to be at MMI. (Stipulation of Fact and Proposed
Medical Panel Questions, pg. 5.) Stabilization was a primary issue in this case
as reflected in the parties stipulated proposed question #3. If the fusion
30

R. 113. at 116

3,

R. 120

32

R. 144

23

Supra, note 11
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Supra. note 32, at 145
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surgery is not reasonable, has petitioner reached MMI? I do not understand
why respondents would now argue that we stipulated to a January 14. 2002
MMI date.
We respectfully request that the Medical Panel Report be admitted into
evidence.
It appears that TTD and TPD have not been paid correctly throughout
this claim. (Compare TTD paid, Stipulation page 3, with the income chart,
Stipulation pg. 5) Therefore, we request an order for Temporary7 Total
Disability/Temporary Partial Disability through MMI of June 10, 2004, less
amounts actually paid, plus 8% interest. I would be happy to prepare a chart
of these benefits if it would be helpful.3:>
9. In accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-410 (2) (2006):
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee
reaching a fixed state of recovery, and when no light duty employment is
available to the employee from the employer, temporary disability benefits
shall continue to be paid.
However, §34A-2-411(1999) reduces that obligation of the Employer when the injury
causes only partial disability for work, prior to medical stability, in which event the
employee's disability compensation is reduced to equal:
"(a) 66-2/3% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before
the accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but
not more than 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury; plus
$5.00 . . . for each dependent child . . ."
10. Judge Session's Order should have reflected an appropriate adjustment in the
award of temporary disability benefits for those various periods of time between March 18,
1999 through June 10, 2004, as reflected in that Stipulation of the parties, during which
Employee was working on a light duty basis for her Employer or others. If the required
35

Id.
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adjustments had been made, the award would have been significant!} less. As reflected in
Employee's letter of December L 2005 and the attached computations, if those required
adjustments had been made, the Award would have onh amounted to $92,956.46 (after
deducting the $6.136.66 previous!) paidbx Employer). When combined with the applicable
interest at 8% per annum from the dates those payments were due through December 15,
2005 of $30,104.76. that brought the total amount of the award to $123.061.20.36
11. Employer failed to timeh file any Motion for Review or Motion for
Reconsideration before the Order became final.
12. Beginning on November 4.2005. Employee's attorney placed several calls to one
of Frito-Lay's attorneys and left messages requesting payment of Employee's disability
compensation. Frito-Lay's attorney did not return those calls.37
13. On December 1.2005. Employee's attorney got through to another of Frito-Lay's
attorneys. In that telephone conversation. Employee's attorney pointed out that Judge
Sessions' decision awarded a larger sum of disability compensation than was warranted
under the parties' stipulated facts. Employee's attorney advised that, notwithstanding Judge
Sessions' award. Employee would accept the lesser amount of disability7 compensation
consistent with the stipulated facts.18

"b Supra, note 25
r]

Supra, note 3, at 461
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14. In a letter dated December 6,2005, Frito-Lay *s attorney rejected that offer, based
on the attorney's own evaluation of Employee's claim and without reference to the terms of
Judge Session's decision.39
15. After rejecting Employee's demand for payment, Frito-Lay took no action to
challenge Judge Sessions' decision, nor did Frito-Lay pay the compensation awarded to her
by that decision.40
16. On December 20, 2005, Employee asked Judge Sessions to issue an abstract of
judgment so she could force Frito-Lay to pay the compensation.41
17. On December 21,2005, Employer filed a document entitled CwRule 60(b) Motion
for Relief from Judgment" asking Judge Sessions to set aside his award of temporary total
disability compensation and to conduct an evidentiary hearing on that issue.42
18. On March 17, 2006, Judge Sessions denied Employer's Motion on the grounds
that Frito-Lay had not satisfied the standards set forth in Rule 60(b) Ut. R. Civ. P. for
granting such a request.43 More specifically, in that Order, Judge Sessions found and
determined:
Respondent filed his motion 90 days after the entry of the final order.
However, Respondent has failed to make his case out for the relief requested
39

Id.

"Id.
"Id.
42

Id.

43

Id.
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in that insufficient grounds for mistake, surprise or excusable neglect exists.
Respondent failed to return telephone calls to Petitioner's counsel and grossh
neglected to request relief from the order b> wa> oi appeal within the 30 days
allowed b) law and rule for such relief il he in fact was confused b> the
amended order itself
Given thehiston of the attempts to communicate between counsel after
the order issued, and the fact that Respondent waited too long to file an appeal,
it would be unjust for the order to be set aside at this time. If Respondent was
truh confused, his efforts should have focused on clearing that confusion by
wa\ of motion for review within the appropriate period instead of trying to
rescue the dela) by this method. In addition. Respondent advances the
Affidavit of Andrew Wadsw orth which demonstrates that Respondent intended
to dispute the claimed amount, but onh announced that to Counsel for
Petitioner on December 1.2005. a period still beyond the appeal period. Then
some 20 days later Respondent filed the current motion. This is not indicative
of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. It would be unjust to set the
amended order aside under the facts of this case. * H' *
Because no appeal was taken, and because the motion for relief from
judgment was filed without sufficient grounds made out as required in Rule
60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as outlined above, the Rule 60(b) Motion
for Relief from Judgment must be denied.44
As reflected above. Judge Session's Order was not limited to a determination, as claimed by
Employer, that, "he had no authority to correct the misinterpretation or mistake.'*45
19. Employer did file a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the Labor
Commission for review of Judge Session's Order denying that Motion. The Appeals Board
dismissed the Rule 60(b) Motion, finding:
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that adjudication of Ms. Clausing's
workers' compensation claim is governed by the provisions of UAPA, the
Labor Commission Act. and the Utah Workers* Compensation Act. These
statutes do not authorize Frito-Lay's attempt to use Rule 60 (b), U.R.C.P.. as
1

Supra, note 18

^Employer's Brief. Statement of Facts No. 16

a method to obtain relief from Judge Sessions' decision of September 23,
2005. Because Frito-Lay's purported Rule 60(b) motion was not cognizable
in this workers' compensation proceeding, Judge Sessions' decision addressing
the merits of the Rule 60 (b) motion is a nullity.46
20.

In a previous proceeding between the parties, Case No. 2001163,

Administrative Law Judge, Sharon Eblen,did enter an Order dated October 22, 2002, as
attached as Exhibit "F" to Employer's Brief. That Order found Employer liable for the
industrial knee and low back injury, as well as the subsequent May 21,2000 fall, and ordered
payment of certain undisputed but unpaid permanent partial disability compensation. That
Order did not address the issue of temporary disability benefits in any manner nor did it
indicate, as Employer states in its Brief, that, "No Temporary Total Disability was awarded,
inasmuch as Clausing was working at the time, and all time where she had not worked up to
that date, October 22, 2002, had already been paid."47
21. Employee's Application for the present hearing specifically sought, among other
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, together with temporary total disability benefits
for the various periods when she was wholly unable to work due to treatment for surgeries
prior to reaching medical stability.48
22.

There is no factual basis for Employer's claim of any "intentional

misinterpretation" of Judge Session's Order by Employee's Counsel. Rather, the language
of the Order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous for the Appeals Board to interpret the
46

Supra, note 3

47

Employer's Brief, p. 4.

48
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Order in precisely the same manner as Employee and her counsel. As stated b\ the appeals
Board in the Order from which Employer now appeals:
The decision awarded temporary total disability compensation to Ms. Clausing
for the entire period between her work accident and the date she reached
medical stability. with no reduction for her work and earnings during that
period.49
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I.

A.

The Commission did not err in determining that the applicable statutes
did not authorize Employer's use of its Rule 60 (b) Motion to obtain relief
from Judge Sessions' Order of September 23, 2005.

Neither the applicable statutes nor the Commission's administrative rules
provide for the use of a 60(b) Motion in workers' compensation proceedings.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that administrative proceedings are not subject to

the Ut. R. Civ. P. unless the governing statute or regulations so provide. Neither UAPA,
the Labor Commission Act nor the Worker's Compensation Act, provide that Rule 60(b)
applies to workers' compensation proceedings. The administrative rules adopted by the
Commission provide that certain provisions of the Rules are applicable to such proceedings,
but Rule 60(b) is noticeabh absent.
B.

The Commission's decision is not contrary to any public policy requirement that
Rule 60(b) relief be applied to its proceedings.
The Utah Supreme Court has previousl) rejected the assertion that there is an "implied

public polic}" requiring that Rule 60(b) be applied to worker's compensation proceedings,
opting instead for the "more pertinent public policy" that the Commission may prescribe its
own procedural rules and the statutory requirements specifying time periods within which
AQ

Supra, note 3

appeals must be sought. This Court is not the appropriate venue for seeking such statutory,
or administrative rule, changes.
C.

The Commission's decision is not contrary to the statutory provisions providing
for motions for reconsideration.
Motions for reconsideration are regularly considered by the Commission. However,

they are also subject to statutory time limits and Employer did not timely undertake the
appropriate actions for seeking a Motion for Reconsideration in this matter.
D.

The Commission's decision is not contrary to the "continuing jurisdiction"
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act
The "continuing jurisdiction" of the Commission is not without limits. Other than for

correction of mere "clerical errors," the Commission has authority to modify a prior, "final"
award only if there has been some intervening significant change in circumstances which
would justify that modification. There was no such significant change in circumstances in
this case.
POINT II.

Employer failed to properly marshal the evidence.

An appellant may not select only portions of the material facts to set forth on appeal.
Rather, an Appellant must basically act as a "devil's advocate," presenting in comprehensive
and fastidious order every scrap of competent evidence introduced with regard to the case,
which supports the findings which it now resists. Rather than marshaling all of the evidence
in support of the Order, Employer has referenced only those facts it deems helpful to its
appeal. In view of Employer's failure to marshal the evidence, the Court may properly
assume that the evidence supports the Order.

POINT III. Employer, even in a trial court setting, would not be permitied to use its
Rule 60(b) morion as a substitute for a timeh appeal
Both this Court and our Supreme Court have previous!} declared that Rule 60(b)
Motions ma) not be based upon Judicial errors of the Court. Otherwise, as those Courts have
noted. Rule 60(b) would improper!} become a substitute for timeh appeals. The underlying
Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Order of Judge Sessions, which was the subject
of the Rule 60(b) Motion, was a final Order of the Commission months before Employer
filed its Rule 60(b) Motion. That Motion asserts that Judge Sessions made a judicial error
in awarding temporary total disability benefits at the full rate for the entire period from the
dare of Employee's injur} until she reached medical stability. If Employer wished to appeal
that Order, Employer was required to timel} file a Motion for Review within 30 days of the
date of the Order, which Employer failed to do. Employer may not now7 use Rule 60(b) as
a substitute for its failure to file a timeh Motion for Review.
POINT IV. The facts of this case fail to demonstrate any "Mistake, inadvertence, or
excusable neglect" which, even in a trial court setting, would justify relief
pursuant to Employer's 60(b) Motion.
Although the Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order of Judge Sessions in
the present case was in error, it was not "ambiguous/* The Order clearly set forth the period
of the award of temporary total disabilit} and the weekly amount awarded for that entire
period. The pleadings and other documents of record reflected that Employee was seeking
temporal'} disabilit} benefits for the entire period for which Judge Sessions subsequently
entered his Order. Judge Sessions Order awarded the benefits for that entire period but failed
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to make appropriate adjustments to that award for the periods during which Employee was
able to earn some for light duty work, as the parties had set forth in their prior Stipulation.
Employer chose to ignore the language of the Order and to contest its liability based on the
attorney's own evaluation of Employee's claim, without reference to the terms of Judge
Sessions' Order. Such actions by Employer fail to establish the requisite demonstration of
any "mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect" which, even in a trial court setting, would
justify relief under a Rule 60(b) Motion.
POINT V.

The facts of this case, in any event, fail to demonstrate that Judge Sessions
abused his discretion in denying Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion.

The standard of review on an appeal from a denial of a Rule 60(b) Motion, even from
a trial court, is one of abuse of discretion.

The standard of review as to factual

determinations in a Commission Order is, basically, whether that determination was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In this case, Judge Sessions weighed the underlying
facts and decided that Employer's actions were unot indicative of mistake, inadvertence or
excusable neglect." When the decision is considered in light of all of the underlying material
facts and in a light most favorable to Employee, rather than only the isolated facts set forth
by Employer in a light most favorable to Employer upon which Employer seeks to rely, there
is no basis for any determination that the Order rejecting Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion was
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE
APPLICABLE STATUTES DID NOT AUTHORIZE EMPLOYER'S USE OF ITS
RULE 60(b) MOTION TO OBTAIN RELIEF FROM JUDGE SESSIONS' ORDER
OF SEPTEMBER 23, 2005
A.

NEITHER THE APPLICABLE STATUTES NOR THE COMMISSION'S
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES PROVIDE FOR THE USE OF A 60(b) MOTION
IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS.
The Order of the Appeals Board from which Employer appeals, under the heading

"Discussion and Conclusions of Law/""0 clearly and succinct!}7 sets forth the underlying bases
for their conclusion that Rule 60(b). Ut. R Civ. P was not applicable to that proceeding.
In summar\. they reviewed the background and language under UAPA and noted that
the Commission procedures were subject to UAPA. They also noted that in two areas,
discovers and default UAPA specifically incorporated the standards adopted in the Utah
Rules but in others, chose to establish its own procedures. The Appeals Board summarized
its analysis as follows:
In simple terms, the foregoing provisions of UAPA, the Labor Commission
Act and the Workers* Compensation Act establish a comprehensive and
integrated system that allows the parties to obtain full review and. where
appropriate, complete relief from any factual or legal error that ma) be
contained in an ALJ's decision. However, in seeking such relief, the parties
must follow the procedures created by those statutes, and nothing in UAPA.
the Labor Commission Act. or the Utah Workers' Compensation Act
authorizes the use of the procedures found in Rule 60(b) U.R.CJV 1

'°W.at461
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The Board's conclusion that Rule 60(b) did not apply to the proceeding before it was
neither unreasonable, irrational nor contrary to the governing statutes or rules. There is, in
fact, nothing in UAPA which requires the Commission to adopt Rule 60(b) as part of the
rules applicable to proceedings before it. Neither is there anything in the Ut. R. Civ. P.
which does so.
The Utah Supreme Court has previously confirmed that the Ut. R. Civ. P. do not
extend to administrative hearings such as that before the Commission, finding that service
of process for an administrative hearing was not required to be in accordance with those
Rules^2 and, more recently, that Rule 41 (a) (1) did not apply to administrative matters.33 As
the Court explained:
[Administrative proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure unless the governing statute or regulations so provide.54
In the present case, neither the governing statutes nor Administrative Rules of the
Commission provided that the Ut. R. Civ. P. applied to this proceeding. The Workers
Compensation Act specifically exempts the Commission and its administrative and review
personnel from the application of the provisions of the Ut. R. Civ. P., except as otherwise
specified in the Act. It provides, instead, that the Commission "shall make rules governing

52

Entre Nous Club v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P. 2d 670 (1955)

53

Pilcherv. State Department of Social Services, 663 P. 2d 450 (Utah, 1983). See
also State Tax Commn v. Iverson, 782 P. 2d 519 (Utah, 1989)
54
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adjudicative procedures.^ That Aci further provides that, except as provided in it or in
LAPA. "the rules made under this section are not required to conform to common law or
statuton rules of evidence or other technical rules of procedure."'0 The Act also provides:
The commission, the commissioner, an administrative lav judge, or the
Appeals Board, is not bound by the usual common lav or statutory rules of
evidence, or b) any technical or formal rules or procedure, other than as
provided in this section or as adopted b} the commission...'7
In accordance with the statuton provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act and
UAPA* the Commission has adopted its ow7n rules of procedure. Rather than a wholesale
incorporation by reference. Administrative Rule R602-2-1 provides for only limited
incorporation of the Ut R. Ci\. P.D8 Employee submits there is no reference to Rule 60 (b)
anywhere in those Administrative Rules.
Instead. Administrative Rule R602-2-KM) provides for the review7 of Orders by
Administrative Law Judges and specifies that such review must be requested within thirty
days in accordance with the Motion for Review provisions of Utah Code Anno. §63-46b-12
and 34A-1-303 (1997).
In the absence of any adoption of Rule 60(b) in those Administrative Rules, either by
reference or the use of similar procedural language separate and apart from those under

"Utah Code Anno. §34A-l-304(l)(a) (1997)
"Utah Code Anno. §34A-l-304(l)(b) (1997)
"'Utah Code Anno §34A-2-801(l) (1997)
v]
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Administrative Rule R602-2-l(M), there was no basis for the "Rule 60(b)" review of Judge
Sessions' Order as sought by Employer. The Commission, therefore, properly dismissed the
Employer's Motion, long after the Order was final, seeking such a review.
B.

THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS NOT CONTRARY TO ANY PUBLIC
POLICY REQUIREMENT THAT RULE 60(b) RELIEF BE APPLIED TO ITS
PROCEEDINGS
Employer's contentions that Rule 60(b) should have been incorporated in some

manner by the Workers' Compensation Act, UAPA or by the Commission rules, does not
change the fact that it was not. Such arguments are not properly addressed to this Court but,
rather, should be addressed to the Legislature and/or the Commission's Rulemaking body.
The Supreme Court has considered a situation very similar to that presently asserted
by the Employer in its Brief. In Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Commission,59 the Court
considered an appeal from the law judge's refusal to consider an untimely protest, in which
the issues as asserted by the appellant were (1) whether the Department abused its discretion
in refusing to consider the employer's protest to the benefits awarded because the protest was
not filed within ten days; and (2) whether the administrative law Judge's refusal to consider
the untimely protest contravenes a claimed public policy to relieve a party of default for
"mistake" or "excusable neglect" in view of Rule 60 (b)(1).
The Supreme Court rejected the "implied public policy" arguments based on Rule
60(b) (1). explaining:

1987 UT 13, 733 P. 2d 130 (Utah, 1987)
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It appears to us that the more pertinent public polic} to be applied in this case
is found in section 35-4-2. section 35-4-10(e) (permitting the Department to
prescribe its own procedural rules). and sections 35-4-7, -6, and -10 (imposing
various ten da) filing requirements.)6"
Similar!}, in the present case, the assertion that there must be some relief similar to
Rule 60 (b) before the Commission fails to consider that ""more pertinent public policy/' In
response to the question of what Employer could have done in the present case, the answer
is relativeh simple. If Employer was unsure of the Order's implications. Employer had the
option of timeh filing a Motion for Review.
C.

THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE
STATUTORY PROVISIONS PROVIDING FOR MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Employer also contends that the Commission's decision is contradicted by Utah Code

Anno. §63-46b-13 (2001). which specificall} allows for written requests for reconsideration
with an agency. Motions for Reconsideration of an Order on a Motion for Review are,
indeed, part of the statutory process available in workers compensation cases.61 and are
regularly considered b\ the Commission.62 Be that as it may, Employer failed to file any
Motion for Review, which is the required precursor to a Motion for Reconsideration of a
Commission decision.
b[)

Id at 132

^Administrative Ride R602-2-1 (0) [WA request for reconsideration of an Order on
Motion for Review ma} be allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of Section 6346b-13"]
62

See, for instance, the recent case of McCoy v. Utah Disaster Kleenup. 467 Ut. Adv.
Rep. 23. 2003 UT App. 49 (Utah App.. 2003)
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Further, if Employer wished its Motion to be treated as a Motion to Reconsider, that
Motion would have been required to be timely filed in accordance with the provisions for a
Motion to Reconsider, under Utah Code Anno. §63-46b-13 (2001). That statute requires:
(1) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which
review by the agency or by a superior agency under §63-46b-12 is unavailable,
and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may
file a written request for reconsideration with the agency . . .
As reflected in its specific terms, that statutory provision has no application where,
as in the present case, a Motion for Review could have been filed in a timely manner and was
not "unavailable." Employer's assertions that, as a Motion to Reconsider, its Motion was
timely filed,63 is not correct since it was not filed within the required twenty day time limit.
Rather, it was not filed for nearly three months after the Order was issued.
D.

THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE
"CONTINUING JURISDICTION" PROVISIONS OF THE WORKERS
COMPENSATION ACT
Employer further contends that the Order of the Appeals Board is contradicted by

Career Serv. Review Bd. V. Utah Dept. Of Corrections64 Employer asserts that decision
declares that the Commission has the authority to correct its mistakes, even absent a specific
statute. Employee submits that case does not stand for that proposition. Rather, as the Court
explained in its decision, the issue in that case was whether the administrative agency
retained jurisdiction over a matter after an appeal of the decision has been dismissed and if

"Employer's Brief, p. 29
64

942P.2d933(Utah, 1997)
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so. "whether the agency's continuing jurisdiction includes the authority to modiiy its
previous order on the basis of subsequently discovered facts. "() (emphasis ours)
That decision was in keeping with numerous other decisions of the Utah courts
declaring that the Labor Commission can exercise continuing jurisdiction to modifs a prior
award, but only if there has been some significant change.66
Paulsen v. Industrial Commission,bl cited by Employer, is also wholly consistent with
those foregoing decisions in that it requires a "substantial change" in the circumstances in
order for the Commission to have authority7 to modify a prior final Order. In Paulsen, the
Commission awarded benefits and found that the Employer did not have insurance and w7as
insolvent so the Fund paid the benefits. Neither party' sought review. Subsequently, at the
Fund's request, the Administrative Law Judge amended the aw7ard to state that the Employer
was liable to reimburse the Fund directly. The Court outlined the effect of the "continuing
jurisdiction" provisions of the Act as follows:
We have held that this section gives the Commission broad authority to make
substantive changes in its orders when substantial changes in the
circumstances have occurred [citing cases]. We see no reason that section 35b

Vd at 943

66

See Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel 965 P. 2d 583, 587 (Utah App., 1998)
["The basis for reopening a claim is provided by w evidence of some significant change or new
development in the claimant's injur} or proof of the previous awrard*s inadequacy."]; Ortega
v. Meadow Valley Construction. 2000 UT 24. 996 P. 2d 1039 (Utah, 2000) ["(T)he
Commission's exercise of its continuing jurisdiction requires "evidence of some significant
change or new development in the claimant"s injur}' or proof of the previous award's
inadequacy."]
770 P. 2d 125 (Utah. 1989)

1-78 should not also be construed to permit mere clerical changes in the
Commission's orders * * *
The next question is whether the amendment obtained by the Fund was one
correcting a clerical error. We think it was. Again, useful analogy may be
made to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (a), which addresses the power of
trial courts to correct clerical errors. Under that rule, we have drawn a
distinction between "clerical errors," which a court may correct, and "judicial
errors,' which it may not. A clerical error is one made in recording a judgment
that results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual
intention of the court. On the other hand, a judicial error is one made in
rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect judgment,
[citing cases]68 (emphasis ours).
As reflected in the foregoing language, and contrary to the assertions of Employer,
Paulsen does not declare that "[t]he Commission's authority to make substantive changes,
which is also undisputed, is comparable to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and allowed
in administrative proceedings."69 To the contrary, Paulsen clarifies the fact that the
Commission is without authority to amend final Orders, other than for mere '"clerical errors,"
where no "'substantial change" is demonstrated.
Employee submits that Employer has failed to demonstrate any "substantial change"
to justify the correction sought to Judge Sessions' Order of September 23, 2005 and that
Employer has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the Appeals Board erred in
determining that the Employer's use of a Rule 60(b) Motion was not proper. Such Motions
are not available in workers' compensation proceedings before the Labor Commission and
no "clerical" error or change of circumstances was demonstrated.

6

*Id. at 130

69

Employer's Brief, p. 26
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POINT II
EMPLOYER FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
Am appeal from Labor Commission matters is general!) high]} fact dependent. Since
Employer's Brief asserts that the Commission improperh denied its Rule 60 (b) motion, and
since the standard of review of an) Judge denying a Rule 60 (b) Motion is an "'abuse of
discretion" standard.70 it is vital that Employer full} and complete!) set forth all of the
material facts upon which the Order ma) have been based, so that all of those relevant facts
ma} be properly considered by this Court.
Employer has the duty7, in such situations, to carefull) and properly "marshal*" the
evidence before the Commission. The) ma) not select onl) portions of the material facts to
set forth, or set forth only those facts which reflect their claims in the most favorable light.
Rather, the} must basically act as a ""devil's advocate." presenting, "in comprehensive and
fastidious order, ever)7 scrap of competent evidence introduced" with regard to that motion
"which supports the very findings the appellant resists."71
Marshaling the evidence on an appeal is a process fundamental^ different from that
of presenting their claims at the hearing. As the Utah Supreme Court recently explained in
Chen, 2 in a recent, extensive attempt to reiterate the requirements of marshaling:
Appellants cannot mere]} present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the
record in support of their position [citing cases] Nor can they simply restate
™Supra, note 9
11

West Valley v. Majestic Im\ Co., 818 P. 2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App., 1991)

T

-Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, 100 P. 3d 1177 (Utah. 2004)
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or review evidence that points to an alternate finding or a finding contrary to
the trial court's finding of fact [citing cases] Furthermore, appellants cannot
shift the burden of marshaling by falsely claiming that there is no evidence in
support of the trial court's findings.73
The Court went on to emphasize that, "If the marshaling requirement is not met, the
appellate court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis alone" and "we
assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings."74
Rather than marshaling all the evidence in support of the Order, as mandated,
Employer has referenced only some of the relevant facts and has referenced the facts from
its own point of view. Employee has been required, therefore, to extensively supplement the
facts asserted by Employer in an attempt to place all of the relevant facts before the Court.
When all of the material facts are considered, it becomes clearer that this case does
not involve some 'intentional misinterpretation" of an "ambiguous" Order by Employee's
counsel and the Appeals Board, as Employer would have the Court believe. Rather, it
involves an Order in which Judge Sessions awarded temporary total disability benefits to
Employee for the entire period from the date of her injury through the date she reached
medical stability, as Employee had requested, but in which he failed to including the
appropriate adjustments for the amounts she was able to earn while engaged in light duty
work during that period as detailed in paragraph 12 of the Stipulation of the parties. The
material facts further demonstrate that Judge Sessions' error could readily and timely been

73

Id at 1195

74

Id at 1196. See also Merriamv. Industrial Comm'n, 812 P. 2d 447,450 (Utah App.,
1991) and Featherstone v. Industrial Comm % 877 P. 2d 1251, 1254 (Utah App., 1994)
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resolved b) Employei through a limeh Motion for Review to the Labor Commission As
with an} other Judgment, when no appeal was timeh taken, the Order and the judicial error
included in it became final.
POINT III
EMPLOYER, EVEN IN A TRIAL COURT SETTING, WOULD
NOT BE PERMITTED TO USE ITS RULE 60(b) MOTION
AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A TIMELY APPEAL
When an appeal is taken from a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion, the onl) issue properly
before the court is the propriety of the denial of that motion. As this Court stated Franklin
Covey Client Sales v. Melvin. "Appellate review of Rule 60(b) Orders must be narrowed in
this manner lest Rule 60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals."75
For that same reason. Rule 60(b) Motions based upon Judicial errors of the Court are
not permitted. In Franklin Covey, this Court affirmed the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion
which was based upon MelvhTs assertions that the trial court made a mistake in its adoption
of findings of fact which were insufficient to support its conclusions of law. The Court
explained that wrongl) deciding a point of lav* is not such "mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect" as would sustain a Rule 60(b) motion:
In sum, Melvin has not even attempted to present "mistakes' for which relief
may be obtained under Rule 60(b)( 1). Instead, having missed the deadline for
appealing the summary judgment and declarator} judgment order, he attempts
to enter the "back door* to the merits of the case b) appealing the denial of his
Rule 60(b) motions. We reject Melvin*s attempt to present for our review
issues that would onh have been properl) before us on a direct, timely appeal
from the summary judgment and the resulting declarator}7 judgment order.76
^Franklin Covey. Supra, note 9. at ^ 19
16

Id at TI25

Utah's Supreme Court has also confirmed that Rule 60(b) is not an appropriate means
of correcting a judicial error in a judgment. In Fisher v. Bybee,11 the Court considered a
denial of a Rule 60(b) (1) motion which alleged that a judgment was based on a mistaken
application of the law. The Court affirmed the denial explaining:
Mr. Bybee maintains that Judge Harding mistakenly interpreted section 78-12-22 of
the Utah Code when he entered a renewed judgment against him initiated by motion,
not a new lawsuit. While the trial court agreed with Mr. Bybee that the debtor
judgment should not have been renewed based on Fishers' motion, it did not void the
judgment under rule 60(b)(1), holding that rule 60(b)(1) was proper to remedy only
a clerical mistake, not a major judicial misapprehension of the law. We agree with
the trial Court.78
In Lange v. Eby,79 the Supreme Court again considered the appeal from a trial court's
denial of a rule 60(b) motion in which Eby claimed he was entitled to be credited with
amounts from a prior settlement and sought to have the Court set aside the Judgment until
his motion to be credited could be determined. The lower Court denied both motions and
Eby appealed. On appeal, Eby attempted to argue that his Rule 60(b) motion was wrongly
denied, as well as his motion to be credited with the settlement. The Court limited Eby's
appeal to ^challenging the grounds for denial of the rule 60(b) motion" on the basis that the
Court lacked jurisdiction over his appeal of the Judgment as the time for an appeal had run.
Eby then contended that "he is entitled to relief from the judgment because the trial court
wrongly denied him relief under rule 60(b) by not crediting him with the Geary settlement

11

512 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2004 UT 92 (Utah, 2004)

n

Id. at T|9

79

2006UTApp. 118, 133 P. 3d 451 (Utah App., 2006)
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under Viah Code Anno §15-4-3/" The Court rejected that argument and aflirmed the trial
Court's denial of the Rule 60(b) Motion, explaining:
We agree with Lange that Eh) cannot raise the merits of his argument that he
should be credited the settlement amount because it is not within the scope of
his appeal from the denial of his rule 60(b) motion. We have previoush held
that a rule 60(b) motion is not the appropriate means to raise a mistake of law.
See id. at Para. 21 [Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110.
Para. 9, 2 P. 3d 451] Cw[A]n appeal or motion for a new trial rather than a
[Rule] 60 (b) motion, is the proper avenue to redress mistakes of law
committed by the trial judge") (alterations in original) (quotations and citations
omitted)). Moreover, although this court analyzed rule 60(b)91). we also noted
more generalh that an appeal from a 60(b) motion "'does not. at least in most
cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was
sought."" Id. at para 19 (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore, et aL Moore's
Federal Practice §60.68[3] (3d ed. 1999)). A rule 60(b) motion cannot wtbe
used as a 'back door' to a direct appeal of the underlying [motions]/' Id at
Para. 23. Instead, we must narrow an appeal of a rule 60(b) order to the denial
or grant of relief so that it does not "'become a substitute for timely appeals/"
Id. at Para. 19 (quoting Moore et aL supra. §60.68[3]).
The Utah Supreme Court endorsed the reasoning of Franklin Covey in Fisher
v. Bybee. 2004 UT 92.104 P. 3d 1198. and "categorically removed legal error
from the realm of mistakes recognized under rule 60(b)( 1 )/* Id. at Para. 11.
The Fisher decision noted that Franklin Cove)' cited Moore s Federal Practice
in explaining "'the rationale for a restrictive rule 60(b) review. Id. at Para. 10;
see also Moore et aL, supra. §60.68[3]. Eby attempts to avoid the mandate of
Fisher and Franklin Covey by characterizing his motion as being brought
under rule 60(b)(4). (5), and (6), not just rule 60(b)(1).
However, the essence of Eby's argument is that the trial court committed legal
error in not crediting him with settlement, resulting in a void, unfair, and/or
inequitable judgment. Moore's treatise, as concurred in b\ both ihe Fisher and
Franklin Covey opinions, makes clear that all rule 60(b) motions attacking the
legality of a trial court ruling are substitutes for timeh appeals and will not
succeed. See Moore et aL, supra. §60.68[3].80

7tf.,at1J7

As reflected in its extensive arguments in its Brief, Employer in the present case is
attempting to assert in its appeal that its Rule 60(b) motion was improvidently denied because
of Judge Sessions' judicial error in making an award to Employee which was not in
accordance with the Stipulation of the parties. As reflected in the foregoing decisions, this
Court should properly affirm the dismissal of that Rule 60(b) Motion, even if it should find
that Rule 60(b) motions are generally applicable to workers' compensation proceedings.
Such action is mandated in accordance with the Court's previous declaration that, uRule
60(b) motions attacking the legality of a trial court ruling are substitutes for timely appeals
and will not succeed."81
POINT IV
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE FAIL TO DEMONSTRATE ANY
"MISTAKE, INADVERTENCE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT" WHICH,
EVEN IN A TRIAL COURT SETTING, WOULD JUSTIFY RELIEF
PURSUANT TO EMPLOYER'S 60(B) MOTION
Employee certainly recognizes that Judge Sessions' Order of September 23,2005, was
erroneous. However, that Order was not "ambiguous" as claimed by Employer, particularly
when considered together with the Medical Panel Report and Stipulation of the Parties which
were incorporated into it. The Appeals Board had no difficulty in interpreting that Order as
awarding disability benefits at $487.00 per week for the entire period from the date of the
Employee's accident (March 18, 1999) to the date she reached medical stability (June 10.

{

Id.
-36-

2004)K2 and neither did Employee's Counsel.8'

If Employer found the Order to be

ambiguous, as il claims, it had a read} remed) of seeking a Motion for Review to correct that
alleged "ambiguity." Rather, as noted by the Commission, the Employer chose to ignore that
alleged "ambiguit\" and to contest its liability under the Order "based on the attorney's own
evaluation of Ms. Clausing's claim and without reference to the terms of Judge Session's
decision."84
Despite Employer's protests to the contrary. Employer either knew, or reasonably
should have known, prior to the issuance of Judge Session's Order, that Employee was
seeking an award of temporary disability for the periods set forth in the Court's Order.
Employee's Application specified that she wras seeking temporary partial disability benefits
together with temporary' total disability benefits, for the periods of time she was unable to
work due to her injuries and treatments.8- Employee's Pre-hearing Disclosures indicated she
w7as seeking such benefits and noted, wwWe believe that the full payment of TTD and TPD was
not paid after the various knee surgeries. However, there does not seem to be any dispute
regarding the dates and we hope to have this issue resolved before the hearing."86

The

parties did. in fact, resolve those disputes regarding the dates and they were incorporated in

n

Supra* note 3

^Employee's Statement of Facts No. 22
u

Id at 461

^Employee's Statement of Facts No. 21
86

Employee's Statement of Facts No. 4
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paragraph 12 of the Stipulation.

Paragraph 12 specifically set forth the various dates, from

the date of Employee's work related injury on March 18, 1999 through the date of the
Stipulation, when Employee was able to work in a light duty capacity, as well as the various
earnings she had for those dates. It further specified that the Stipulation was executed on
September 15, 2004 and that "temporary total or temporary partial disability thereafter will
need to be addressed at a later date."88 The medical panel determined that Employee did not
reach medical stability until June 10,2004, when Dr. Morgan indicated uhe had nothing else
to offer and her condition had not changed."89
Judge Sessions did not consider the late filing of the Objection to the medical panel
report filed by Employer. Therefore, the Judge did not consider Employee's Response.
However, Employer still received that Response in which Employee once again indicated that
temporary total and temporary partial disability benefits had not been paid correctly, as
reflected on the income chart at paragraph 12 of the Stipulation, and that, therefore,
Employee was requesting "an order for Temporary Total Disability/Temporary Partial
Disability through MMI of June 10, 2004, less amounts actually paid, plus 8% interest.'"90
At that point, Employer was also deemed to know the Statutes which provided for
temporary total and temporary partial disability benefits for the Employee based upon her

87

Employee*s Statement of Facts Nos. 5 and 3

88

Employee's Statement of Facts No. 3

89

Employee's Statement of Facts No. 6

90

Employee's Statement of Facts No. 8
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abiiin to engage in light dut\ work during the period of thai disabilitx as reflected at
paragraph 12 of the Stipulation.91
Given all of the foregoing documentation and information. Employer must be deemed
to have known, or at least certainh should have known, upon receipt that Judge Session's
Order had awarded Employee Temporary Total Disability benefits for the entire period from
the date of her work related injun on March 18, 1999 through the date she reached medical
stability on June 10. 2004, at the rate of $487.00 per week92, which is a total of $126.814.34
(after deduction of the $6,136.60 previoush paid). Accumulated interest had accrued at 8%
per annum from the dates those payments were due. amounting to an additional $56,747.51
through December 15. 2005. for a total through that date of $183.561.85.93
The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission readih understood the clear meaning
of that Order94 as being precisely the same thing understood b) Employee and her attorney.
The Appeals Board and the Employee and her attorney similarly understood that the Order
embodied a legal error as it did not appl} appropriate adjustments to the award for the various
times during the period of the award when Employee was able to engage in light duly work,
as specified in paragraph 12 of the Stipulation which was incorporated in the Order.

^'Employee's Statement of Facts No. 9
92

Judge Sessions' Order, Supra, note 11 and Appeals Board Order, Supra, note 3

93

Supra, note 25
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Supra, note 3
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Employer knew, or should have known, from reading that Order that the foregoing
award had been made to Employer by reason of that Order. Employer either also knew, or
reasonably should have known, that Order was not correct and embodied that legal error
previously discussed.
If Employer did not understand, for whatever reason, the plain meaning of that Order,
and believed that the Order was ambiguous, Employer's obligation remained the same. As
specified in that Order, the Employer had 30 days within which to file an appropriate Motion
for Review with the Commission or the Appeals Board. Instead, Employer inappropriately
chose not to file any such Motion and yet still refused to pay the award.
As reflected in Employee's Statement of Facts, Employee recognized that the Order
was in error and attempted to contact Employer's counsel. Beginning within two weeks after
entry of the Order. Employee's attorney attempted to call Employer's attorneys and left
messages regarding payment of the compensation, but Employer's attorneys did not return
her calls. Despite those attempts, it was neither Employee's duty, nor was it appropriate, for
her to file a Motion to Review to secure a correction for the benefit of the Employer.
On December 1,2005, Employee's counsel finally got through to one of Employer's
other attorneys and willingly offered to accept the $123,061.20 which should have been
awarded by the Court, taking into consideration the offsets referenced in paragraph 12 of the
Stipulation, even though Employer had failed to file a Motion for Review. She followed that
with her letter dated December 1, 2005, in which she confirmed that offer and attached
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computations of that offer as well as the computations of the award as set forth in the Judge's
Order/"
As the Commission noted. Employer's offer was rejected b} Employer's counsel
based on the attorn e> \s own eA aluation of Ms. Clausing's claim and without reference to the
terms of Judge Session's decision.% After rejecting that demand. Employer still took no
action to challenge the decision or to pa} Employee benefits.
Onl) after the Employee finally requested, on December 20.2005, the issuance of an
Abstract of the Award, to allow her to seek to enforce the award in Court, did the Employer
bother to seek itstawRule60(b)" relief.97
As reflected in prior decisions of the Utah's Courts, with regard to a movant's
obligations under a Rule 60(b) (1) Motion. "We have heretofore defined ''excusable neglect"
as the exercise of "due diligence" by a reasonably prudent person under similar
circumstances.
The Court in Mini Spas, specifically considered issues on appeal which were similar
to those asserted b} Employer throughout its brief, with regard to Rule 60 (b)(1), to-wit:
(1) whether the Department abused its discretion in refusing to consider the
employer's protest to the benefits awarded because the protest was not filed
within ten days; and (2) whether the administrative law Judge's refusal to
^Employee's Statement of Facts Nos. 10. 13
^Employee's Statement of Facts No. 14
Employee's Findings of Fact Nos. 15, 16, 17
%

M/7/ Spas, Supra, note 59. at 131. See also Airkcm Intermountain v. Parker, 30
Utah 2d 65, 513 P. 2d 429 (Utah, 1973)
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consider the untimely protest contravenes a claimed public policy to relieve a
party of default for "mistake" or 'excusable neglect'99
The Court, however, rejected the "'implied public policy" arguments based on Rule
60(b) (1), explaining:
It appears to us that the more pertinent public policy to be applied in this case
is found in section 35-4-2, section 35-4-10(e) (permitting the Department to
prescribe its own procedural rules), and sections 35-4-7. -6, and -10 (imposing
various ten day filing requirements.
The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the Board, indicating that those
arguments were "without merit" and that:
[T]he undisputed facts here do not support any claim that the employer
diligently acted in a reasonably prudent manner in failing to file its response
until three weeks after it was due. With knowledge that the notice was
forthcoming and a response was necessary, the employer's neglect or mistake
was not excusable.100
In Airkem101. the Court similarly refused to overturn the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion
by the trial court, where the judgment was entered against a defendant who failed to appear
in person or through counsel at the trial, alleging that his attorney had not been able to
contact him because he was employed in an adjoining county and gone from early in the
morning until late at night, and his wife was ill and had been in a hospital for several months.
The Court noted, however:
In the instant action, defendant was informed in February that the matter would
probably be set for trial in early autumn; he also knew of the irregular hours
"Mini Spas, Id. at 130
100

M at 132

m
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during which he was present in his home. His failure to contact his counsel
under such circumstances from Februan to September 21 could reasonably be
considered as not constituting due diligence b} the trial court. Defense counsel
was informed in earl} Ma} of the trial setting in September, his belated efforts
ten days prior to trial to contact his client, particular!} when there is no
allegation as to the means of communication utilized, might reasonabh be
considered as not indicating due diligence. Since defendant's conduct was not
entireh inexcusable, the trial court did not abuse its discretion b} refusing to
relieve defendant of the judgment.102
Employee submits that the actions of Employer and its counsel as previously outlined
and as considered b} Judge Sessions, come far short of am exercise of "due diligence" by
a reasonabh prudent person. Such actions ma} arguabh be claimed to have been due to
"oversight or negligence" but they were not such as to constitute "excusable negligence."
In an} event, it was not an abuse of discretion by Judge Sessions to determine that such
actions did not comport with *"due diligence" or constitute "excusable neglect."
Under such circumstances. Employer should not no\* be heard to complain that
"public policy" somehow demands that Employer be provided with additional equitable
remedies to correct the judicial error of Judge Sessions, even beyond what would be allowed
if Rule 60(b) had been "cognizable" in this proceeding.
The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission in the present case properly looked to
the provisions of UAPA* the Labor Commission Act. and the LItah Workers' Compensation
Act. along with its own Rules, and determined that the Employer had a remed} readily
available in that it could have timel} filed a Motion for Review. As the Board explained:

]02
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This review procedure is well known to attorneys practicing before the Labor
Commission. It is simple and inexpensive. It does, however, require that
parties carefully read and evaluation the ALJs" decisions within the 30-day
period permitted for filing requests for review. In this case, because Frito-Lay
never requested review of Judge Sessions' decision, it waived its opportunity
to request correction.103
Finally, Employer asserts that the "discovery rule" should somehow be applied as in
in a fraud case, because ''Clausing did not make her unjustified demand based on her
admitted misinterpretation of the Order until December 1, 2005"104 and "Clausing's
interpretation of the Order, which she admits is contrary to the evidence, was concealed until
December 1, 2005."1(b There is absolutely no support in the record for those outlandish
claims. Further, those assertions ignore Employer's own obligations and duty to know and
understand the terms of the Order, which it could certainly do as readily as Employee and the
Appeals Board could. The record establishes that Employer knew or reasonably should have
known of the judicial error when the Order was received. There is, therefore, no basis for
the application of a different filing deadline for a Motion for Review through the application
of the "discovery rule."
Appropriate review procedures were available for relief from the judicial error
contained in Judge Session's Order. As the Appeals Board explained, those procedures
required that the Employer "carefully read and evaluate the ALJ's decisions within the 30-
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Supra9 note 3, at 462
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Employer's Brief, p. 29
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da} period permitted for filing request for review ."!06 The failure to do so does not constitute
"excusable negligence" within the terms of Rule 60(b). Neither does it justify the application
of a "discovery rule" to start the 30-da\ appeal period running onh when the attorne) finally
realizes that there is an error in the Order.
It should also be noted that, when reviewing an agency's interpretation of its own
rules, the Court applies an "intermediate standard of review, deferring to an agency's
interpretation as long as it is both reasonable and rational."107 Given all of the underlying
facts of this case, the Commission was neither unreasonable nor irrational in declaring:
Because Frito-Lay's purported Rule 60(b) Motion was not cognizable in this
workers' compensation proceeding. Judge Sessions* decision addressing the
merits of the Rule 60(b) motion is a nullity.
POINT V
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, IN ANY EVENT, FAIL TO
DEMONSTRATE THAT JUDGE SESSIONS ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION IN DENYING EMPLOYER'S RULE 60(b) MOTION
The Standard of Review on appeal of a trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) Motion is
one of "abuse of discretion/* As this Court has previously explained:
A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown [Rule
60(b) grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when
there has been an abuse of discretion.108

* Supra, note 3 at 462
)n

Barnard & Burk, Supra, note 7. at 703

*Jensen* Supra, note 9

Judge Session's Amended Order Denying Rule 60(b) Motion reflects that he fully
considered the allegations of the Employer in seeking that Motion and determined that the
facts, taken as a whole, demonstrated insufficient grounds for ''mistake, surprise, or
excusable neglect" adequate to justify the imposition of Rule 60(b) relief. His findings
included a determination that:
Respondent failed to return telephone calls to Petitioner's counsel and grossly
neglected to request relief from the order by way of appeal within the 30 days
allowed by law and rule for such relief if he in fact was confused by the
amended order itself.109
Judge Sessions further concluded that the actions of the Employer are "not indicative
of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. It would be unjust to set the amended order
aside under the facts of this case."110
Rule 60(b), after all, does not justify relief for "neglect" but, rather, only for
'"excusable neglect." As the Court has previously explained, "We have heretofore defined
"excusable neglect' as the exercise of 'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under
similar circumstances."111
Employer has wholly failed to demonstrate that Judge Sessions' actions in denying
Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion,
particularly when all of the relevant facts are considered in a light most favorable to Judge
Session's Order. Judge Sessions had the full history of Employer's actions, or want of
,09

%?ra,notel8, at 335
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actions, before him as previous!) set forth in Employee's Statement of Facts and as discussed
more full} in Point IV. Judge Sessions failure 10 find "excusable negligence" under such
circumstances was neither arbitral"}, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the Order of the Appeals Board of the Labor Commission
and its dismissal of Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion. Should the Court determine that the
Appeals Board improper!} determined thai Rule 60(b) did not apply to this proceeding, the
Court may still affirm the Order of the Appeals Board to the extent it determined. "Judge
Sessions" decision of September 23, 2005 is final and remains in effect." This Court has
previously declared that an appellate court ma)' affirm a judgment appealed from if it is
sustainable on an} legal ground or theor} apparent on the record, even though that legal
ground or theor}7 differs from that stated by the trial court to the be basis of the ruling or
action.112 In the present case, as previously reflected, the relevant facts establish that Judge
Session's Order denying Employer's Rule 60(b) Motion was not arbitrary7, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion and that his Order of September 23. 2005 should remain final and in
effect. It would, therefore, be appropriate for this Court to affirm the Appeal Board's Order,
even if it determines that Rule 60(b) does apply to this proceeding, leaving Judge Session's
Amended Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order to Correct Benefit Computation
Omission, dated September 23. 2005. in place.

1 ]2

Jvie v. Hickman. 2004 UT App 469, ^|8. n. 3, 105 P. 3d 946 (Utah App., 2004). See
also Barnard & Burk Supra, note 7 at n. 6
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A

is / /a
Respectfully Submitted this
(s day of April, 2007

By:
Gary E.Atkin,SB# 0144
K. Dawn Atkin, SB#
Attorneys for Employee, Amy C. Clausing

-48-

ADDENDUM
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Document

Addendum No,

Amended Order b\ Judge Sessions Denying Rule 60(b) Motion. R. 334

1

Administrative Rule 602-2. Labor Commission Adjudication

2

Utah Code Anno., §34A-2-411

3

Employee's Response to Objection to Medical Panel, R. 144

4

Employee's Letter of 12/01/05 to Employer's Counsel and Calculations, R. 214

5

Employer's Response of 12/06/05 to Employee's 12/01/05 letter, R. 224

6

ADDENDUM
NO. 1

UT\R L^BOR COMMISSION
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ZACHER-CLAUSING,
Petitioner,

AMENDED
ORDER DENYING RULE 60(b)
MOTION FILED BY RESPONDENT AND
DENYING RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ORDER

vs.
FRITO LAY,
Respondent.

Case No. 2003892
Judge Dale W Sessions

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
The ALJ issued a final order in this case dated August 23, 2005. The Order was
.Amended and re-issued September 23, 2005. Copies of the decision were mailed to all parties.
No timely appeal was filed in this case. The Ruling became the final order of the Labor
Commission because no appeal was m fact filed. On December 21, 2005. Respondent filed a
motion entitled "RULE 60(b) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT." On January 3,
2006, Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion. On January 13, 2006, a Reply was filed by
Respondent. On January 17, 2006 Respondent filed a pleading entitled "SUPPLEMENTAL
FILING IN SUPPORT OF RULE 60(b) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT." On
January 23, 2006 Petitioner countered that filing with a Motion to STRIKE SUPPLEMENTAL
FILING February 6, 2006 Respondent filed a MEMORANDUM FN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO STRIKE SUPLEMENTAL FILING.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1
2
3

It is undisputed that the amended final order in this case was entered September
23,2005.
It is undisputed that no appeal was filed within the 30 days following the amended
final order.
It is undisputed that Respondent filed a Rule 60(b) motion on December 21, 2005.
This filing was the 90th day past the entry of the final order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Respondent asks the ALJ to set aside the amended order of September 23, 2005 on the
founds of mistake, surprise and excusable neglect pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
R
ule 60(b)(1).

00C34
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) contains the following language:
ui

. . . On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the flirtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect. . . . [F]or reasons [contained in] ( 1 ) . . . the motion shall be made not more
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken."
Respondent filed his motion 90 days after the entry of the final order. However,
spondent has failed to make his case out for the relief requested in that insufficient grounds for
stake, surprise or excusable neglect exists. Respondent failed to return telephone calls to
titioner's counsel and grossly neglected to request relief from the order by way of appeal
thin the 30 days allowed by law and rule for such relief if he in fact was confused by the
lended order itself.
Given the history of the attempts to communicate between counsel after the order
sued, and the fact that Respondent waited too long to file an appeal, it would be unjust for the
der to be set aside at this time. If Respondent was truly confused, his efforts should have
cused on clearing that confusion by way of motion for review within the appropriate period
stead of trying to rescue the delay by this method. In addition, Respondent advances the
fidavit of Andrew Wadsworth which demonstrates that Respondent intended to dispute the
aimed amount, but only announced that to Counsel for Petitioner on December 1, 2005, a
sriod still beyond the appeal period. Then, some 20 days later Respondent filed the current
lotion. This is not indicative of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. It would be unjust
) set the amended order aside under the facts of this case.
Because it would be unjust to set aside the amended order under the circumstances of
lis case, and because the proof as grounds for the motion is inadequate the motion to set aside
nder URCP 60(b) must be denied.
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter UAPA) provisions establish that an
ggrieved party may file for agency review of a final order by filing a written request for review
vithin 30 days after the issuance of the order. Utah Code Ann., §63-46b-12(l) et seq. Petitioner
ailed to exercise the timely appeal right for this case.
UAPA provisions also discuss obtaining relief from an order by having an order set
teide. However, the statute only addresses relief from a default order and the order in this case
^as not a default order. See Utah Code Ann., §63-46b-ll. These provisions do not rescue a
-ase where a final order has entered which is not a default order.
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Because no appeal was taken, and because the motion for relief from judgment was
led without sufficient grounds made out as required in Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
s outlined above, the Rule 60(b) Motion For Relief From Judgment must be denied
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED- that the Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from
udspient filed by Respondent is demed.
DATED THIS March 17, 2006.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

Dale W Sessions
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL PJGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review7 with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Order was mailed by prepaid U.S.
Postage on March 17, 2006, to the persons/parties at the following addresses:
Amy Zacher-Clausmg
!322 Sonata St
Sa
lt Lake City UT 84116
F

rito Lay
6301 W 4700 S
Reams UT 84118
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ADDENDUM
NO. 2

R.602-2. Labor Commission, Adjudication.
R602-2. Adjudication of Workers1 Compensation and Occupational
Disease Claims.
R602-2-1. Pleadings and Discovery.
A.
Definitions.
1.
"Commission" means the Labor Commission.
2.
"Division" means the Division of Adjudication within
the Labor Commission.
3.
"Application for Hearing" means the request for agency
action regarding a workers' compensation claim.
4.
"Supporting medical documentation" means a Summary of
Medical Record or other medical report or treatment note
completed by a physician that indicates the presence or absence
of a medical causal connection between benefits sought and the
alleged industrial injury.
5.
''Authorization to Release Medical Records7' is a form
authorizing the injured workers' medical providers to provide
medical records and other medical information to the commission
or a party.
6.
"Supporting documents" means supporting medical
documentation, list of medical providers, Authorization to
Release Medical Records and, when applicable; an Appointment of
Counsel form.
7.
"Petitioner" means the person or entity who has filed
an .Application for Hearing.
8.
"Respondent" means the person or entity against whom
the Application for Hearing was filed.
9.
"Discovery motion" includes a motion to compel or a
motion for protective order.
B.
Application for Hearing.
1.
Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by
an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests on the injured
workers, or medical provider, to initiate agency action by filing
an Application for Hearing with the Division. Applications for
hearing shall include an original, notarized Authorization to
Release Medical Records.
2.
An employer or insurance carrier, or any other party
with standing under the Workers' Compensation Act may obtain a
hearing before the Adjudication Division by filing a request for
agency action with the Division.
3.
All Applications for Hearing shall include any
available supporting medical documentation of the claim where
-2-

there is a dispute over medical issues. Applications for Hearing
without supporting documentation and a properly completed
Authorization to Release Medical Records may not be mailed to the
employer or insurance carrier for answer until the appropriate
documents have been provided. In addition to respondent's
answer, a respondent may file a motion to dismiss the Application
for Hearing where there is no supporting medical documentation
filed to demonstrate medical causation when such is at issued
between the parties.
4.
When an Application for Hearing with appropriate
supporting documentation is filed with the Division, the Division
shall forthwith mail to the respondents a copy of the Application
for Hearing, supporting documents and Notice of Formal
Adjudication and Order for Answer.
5.
In cases where the injured worker is represented by an
aittorney, a completed and signed Appointment of Counsel form
shall be filed with the Application for Hearing or upon retention
of the attorney.
C.
Answer.
1.
The respondent (s) shall have 3 0 days from the date of
mailing of the Order for Answer, to file a written answer to the
Application for Hearing.
2.
The answer shall admit or deny liability for the claim
and shall state the reasons liability is denied. The answer
shall state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and
detail that the petitioner and the division may be fully informed
of the nature and substance of the defenses asserted.
3.
All answers shall include a summary of benefits which
have been paid to date on the claim, designating such payments by
category, i.e. medical expenses, temporary total disability,
permanent partial disability, etc.
4.
When liability is denied based upon medical issues,
copies of all available medical reports sufficient to support the
denial of liability shall be filed with the answer.
5.
If the answer filed by the respondents fails to
sufficiently explain the basis of the denial, fails to include
available medical reports or records to support the denial, or
contains affirmative defenses without sufficient factual detail
to support the affirmative defense, the Division may strike the
answer filed and order the respondent to file within 20 days, a
new answer which conforms with the requirements of this rule.
6.
All answers must state whether the respondent is
willing to medicate the claim.
-3-

7.
Petitioners are allowed to timely amend the Application
for Hearing, and respondents are allowed to timely amend the
answer, as newly discovered information becomes available that
would warrant the amendment. The parties shall not amend their
pleading later than 4 5 days prior to the scheduled hearing
without leave of the Administrative Law Judge.
8.
Responses and answers to amended pleadings shall be
filed within ten days of service of the amended pleading without
further order of the Labor Commission.
D.
Default.
1.
If a respondent fails to file an answer as provided in
Subsection C above, the Division may enter a default against the
respondent.
2.
If default is entered against a respondent, the
Division may conduct any further proceedings necessary to take
evidence and determine the issues raised by che Application for
Hearing without the participation of the party in default
pursuant to Section 63-46b-ll(4), Utah Code.
3.
A default of a respondent shall not be construed to
deprive the Employer's Reinsurance Fund or Uninsured Employers'
FUPIU. oi. any appropriate u.ereuses .
4.
The defaulted party may file a motion to set aside the
default under the procedures set forth in Section 63-46b-ll (3) ,
Utah Code. The Adjudication Division shall set aside defaults
upon written and signed stipulation of all parties to the action.
E.
Waiver of Hearing.
1.
The parties may, with the approval of the
administrative law judge, waive their right to a hearing and
enter into a stipulated set of facts, which may be submitted to
the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge may
use the stipulated facts, medical records and evidence in the
record to make a final determination of liability or refer the
matter to the Medical Panel for consideration of the medical
issues pursuant to R602-2-2.
2.
Stipulated facts shall include sufficient facts to
address all the issues raised in the Application for Hearing and
answer.
3.
In cases where Medical Panel review is required, the
administrative law judge may forward the evidence in the record,
including but not limited to, medical records, fact stipulations,
radiographs and deposition transcripts, to a medical panel for
assistance in resolving the medical issues.
F.
Discovery.
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1.
Upon filing the answer, the respondent and the
petitioner may commence discovery. Discovery allowed under this
rule may include interrogatories, requests for production of
documents, depositions, and medical examinations. Discovery
shall not include requests for admissions. Appropriate discovery
under this rule shall focus on matters relevant to the claims and
defenses at issue in the case. All discovery requests are deemed
continuing and shall be promptly supplemented by the responding
party as information comes available.
2.
Without leave of the administrative law judge, or
written stipulation, any party may serve upon any other party
written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in number, including
all discrete subparts, to be answered by the party served. The
frequency or extent of use of interrogatories, requests for
production of documents, medical examinations and/or depositions
shall be limited by the administrative law judge if it is
determined that:
a.
The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or is obtainable from another source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
b.
The party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity
by discovery in the action to obtain the discovery sought; or
c.
The discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
limitations on the parties; resources, and the importance of the
issues at stake in the adjudication.
3.
Upon reasonable notice, the respondent may require the
petitioner to submit to a medical examination by a physician of
the respondent's choice.
4.
All parties may conduct depositions pursuant to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 34A-1-3 08, Utah Code.
5. ^ Requests for production of documents are allowed, but
limited to matters relevant to the claims and defenses at issue
in the case, and shall not include requests for documents
provided with the petitioner's Application for Hearing, nor the
respondents' answer.
6.
Parties shall diligently pursue discovery so as not to
delay the adjudication of the claim. If a hearing has been
scheduled, discovery motions shall be filed no later than 45 days
prior to the hearing unless leave of the administrative law judge
is obtained.
7.
Discovery motions shall contain copies of all relevant
documents pertaining to the discovery at issue, such as mailing
-5-

certificates and follow up requests for discovery. The
responding party shall have 10 days form the date the discovery
motion is mailed to file a response to the discovery motion.
8.
Parties conducting discovery under this rule shall
maintain mailing certificates and follow up letters regarding
discovery to submit in the event Division Intervention is
necessary to complete discovery. Discovery documents shall not
be filed with the Division at the time they are forwarded to
opposing parties.
9.
Any party who fails to obey an administrative law
judge's discovery order shall be subject to the sanctions
available under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
G.
Subpoenas.
1.
Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all
discovery proceedings to compel the attendance of witnesses. All
subpoenas shall be signed by the administrative law judge
assigned to the case, or the duty judge where the assigned judge
is not available. Subpoenas to compel the attendance of
witnesses shall be served at least 14 days prior to the hearing
consistent with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45. Witness fees
and mileage shall be paid by the party which subpoenas the
witness.
2.
A subpoena to produce records shall be served on the
holder of the record at least 14 days prior to the date specified
in the subpoena has provided in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45.
All fees associated with the production of documents shall be
paid by the party which subpoenas the record.
H.
Medical Records Exhibit.
1.
The parties are expected to exchange medical records
during the discovery period.
2.
Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records
contained in his/her possession to the respondent for the
preparation of a joint medical records exhibit at least twenty
(20) working days prior to the scheduled hearing.
3.
The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record
exhibit containing all relevant medical records. The medical
record exhibit shall include all relevant treatment records that
tend*to prove or disprove a fact in issue. Hospital nurses'
notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials need
not be included in the medical record exhibit.
4.
The medical records shall be indexed, paginated,
arranged by medical care provider in chronological order and
bound.
-6-

5.
The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent
shall be delivered to the Division and the petitioner or
petitioner's counsel at least ten (10) working days prior to the
hearing. Late-filed medical records may or may not be admitted
at the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation
or for good cause shown.
6.
The administrative law judge may require the respondent
to submit an additional copy of the joint medical record exhibit
in cases referred to a medical panel.
7.
The petitioner is responsible to obtain radiographs and
diagnostic films for review by the medical panel. The
administrative law judge shall issue subpoenas where necessary to
obtain radiology films.
I.
Hearing.
1.
Notices of hearing shall be mailed to the addresses of
record of the parties. The parties shall provide current
addresses to the Division for receipt of notices or risk the
entry of default and loss of the opportunity to participate at
the hearing.
2.
Judgment may be entered without a hearing after default
is entered or upon stipulation and waiver of a hearing by the
parties.
3.
No later than 45 days prior to the scheduled hearing,
all parties shall file a signed pretrial disclosure form that
identifies; (1) fact witnesses the parties actually intend to
call at the hearing; (2) expert witnesses the parties actually
intend to call at the hearing; (3) language translator the
parties intend to use at the hearing; (4) exhibits, including
reports, the parties intent to offer in evidence at the hearing;
(5) the specific benefits or relief claimed by the petitioner;
(6) the specific defenses that the respondent actually intends to
litigate; (7) whether or not a party anticipates that the case
will take more than four hours of hearing time; (8) the job
categories or titles the respondents claim the petitioner is
capable of performing if the claim is for permanent total
disability, and; (9) any other issues that the parties intend to
a$k the administrative law judge to adjudicate. The
administrative law judge may exclude witnesses, exhibits,
evidence, claims, or defenses as appropriate of any part who
fails to timely file a signed pre-trial disclosure form as set
forth above. The parties shall supplement the pre-trial
disclosure form with information that newly becomes available
after filing the original form.
The pre-trial disclosure form
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does not replace other discovery allowed under these rules.
4.
If the petitioner requires the services of language
translation during the hearing, the petitioner has the obligation
of providing a person who can translate between the petitioner's
native language and English during the hearing. If the
respondents are dissatisfied with the proposed translator
identified by the petitioner, the respondents may provide a
qualified translator for the hearing at the respondent's expense.
5.
The petitioner shall appear at the hearing prepared to
outline the benefits sought, such as the periods for which
compensation and medical benefits are sought, the amounts of
unpaid medical bills, and a permanent partial disability rating,
if applicable. If mileage reimbursement for travel to receive
medical care is sought, the petitioner shall bring documentation
of mileage, including the dates, the medical provider seen and
the total mileage.
6.
The respondent shall appear at the hearing prepared to
address the merits of the petitioner's claim and provide evidence
to support any defenses timely raised.
7.
Parties are expected to be prepared to present their
evidence on the date the hearing is scheduled. Requests for
continuances may be granted or denied at the discretion of the
administrative law judge for good cause shown. Lack of diligence
in preparing for the hearing shall not constitute good cause for
a continuance.
8.
Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Labor
Commission, the evidentiary record shall be deemed closed at the
conclusion of the hearing, and no additional evidence will be
accepted without leave of the administrative law judge.
J.
Motions-Time to Respond.
Responses to all motions other than discovery motions shall
be filed within ten (10) days from the date the motion was filed
with the Division. Reply memoranda shall be filed within seven
(7) days from the date a response was filed with the Division.
K.
Notices.
1.
Orders and notices mailed by the division to the last
address of record provided by a party are deemed served on that
party.
2.
Where an attorney appears on behalf of a party, notice
of an action by the Division served on the attorney is considered
notice to the party represented by the attorney.
L.
Form of Decisions.
Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative
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proceeding shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of
Section 63-46b-5 or 63-45b-10, Utah Code.
M.
Motions for Review.
1.
Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtain
review of an Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge by
filing a written request for review with the Adjudication
Division in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-46b-12
* and Section 34A-1-303, Utah Code. Unless a request for review is
properly filed, the Administrative Law Judge's Order is the final
order of the Commission. If a request for review is filed, other
parties to the adjudicative proceeding may file a response within
2 0 calendar days of the date the request for review was filed.
Thereafter the Administrative Law Judge shall:
a.
Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after
holding such further hearing and receiving such further evidence
as may be deemed necessary;
b.
Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental
Order; or
c.
Refer the entire case for review under Section 34A-28 01, Utah Code.
2.
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental
Order, as provided in this subsection, it shall be final unless a
request for review of the same is filed.
N.
Procedural Rules.
In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Division shall
generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding
discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure are modified by the express provisions of
Section 34A-2-802, Utah Code or as may be otherwise modified by
these rules.
O.
Requests for Reconsideration and Petitions for Judicial
Review.
A request for consideration of an Order on Motion for Review
may be allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of Section
63-46b-13, Utah Code. Any petition for judicial review of final
agency action shall be governed by the provisions of Section 6346b-14, Utah Code.
R602-2-2. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a
case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge
-9-
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LTTAI1 LABOli CODE

34A-2-411
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 99 C J . S Workmens Compensation
§ 567 to 572

S4A-2-41L

Temporary partial disability — ^Jiiouni of payments.

(1J If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, tlie employee
shall receive weekly compensation equal to:
(a) 66 2/3% of the difference between the employee's average weekly
wages before the accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to
earn after the accident, but not more than 100% of the state average
weekfy wage at the time of injury; plus
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the
age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, but onty
up to a total weekly compensation that does not exceed 1009r of the state
average weekly wage at the time of injury.
(2) The commission ma}7 order an awTard for temporary partial disability for
work at any time prior to 12 years after the date of the injury to an employee:
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally
healed and fixed 12 years after the date of injury; and
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 34A-2-417.
(3 J The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor
continue more than 12 years after the date of the injury. Pa37ments shall
terminate when the disability ends or the injured employee dies.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-65.1, enacted by L.
1981, ch.^ 287, § 2; 1988, ch. 116, § 2; 1990,
ch. 69, § 2; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240,
§ 154; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375,
§ 119; 1999, ch. 261, fe 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 35A-3-

411, substituted ' commission' for' department"
m Subsection (2) and "34A-2-417'* for "35A-3417'1 in Subsection (2Kb), and made stylistic
changes
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999,
substituted "12 years" for 'eight years' in two
p l a c e s m Subsection (2) and in Subsection (3J.

34A-2-412. Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments.
(1) An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an
industrial accident and who files an application for hearing under Section
34A-2-417 may receive a permanent partial disabilitj7 award from the commission.
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:,AB3F C O M K I S S I O L N OF UTAH
P.O. Box 14 6 615
Salt Lake City, Urah 84L14-6G1J

Re:

iL f *

Amy C.aus-ng
Case Wo. 2003B92
Response tc Respondent's Objection to
Medical Panel Report.

rhe

Dear Judge Sessions,
Please accept t n i s l e r r e r as our Response to Respondent's
0biec~ion to tne Medical Panel Fepcrt.
We agree v i t h Respondents
tnat the 5% P?D tea a] ready been paid, bur we dxsacree t h a t the
parries s t i p u l a t e d to a s t a b i l i z a t i o n d a t e .
lr 2002r tne p a r t i e s stipulated t h a t a 5% r a t i n g of tne low
sack was due no the o r i g i n a l injury date of 18 March 1999, as
opposed to rhe r e s u l t i n g f a l l down one s t a i r s wnicn occurred or
21 May 2000.
I t makes no difference from a l e g a l standooint i f
the impairment i s Pased on the 1999 i n d u s t r i a l accident or ohe
resulting fal.l in 2000. We agree t h a t tne 51 low back impairment
has been paid by Responaents and no a d d i t i o n a l impairment i s due.
we disagree t h a t P e t i t i o n e r s t i p u l a t e d t o s t a b i l i z a t i o n dare
of January 14, 2002.
There i s no such s t i p u l a t i o n outlined in
writing.
January 14, 2002 was rhe date of a hearing at which the
parties agreed to c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c a l l y o u t l i n e d b e n e f i t s being
paid, A hearing date i s no basis for a determination of the
compj et.i on of p e t i t i o n e r ' s medical treatment and s t a b i l i s a t i o n of
he^ medical condition.
In fact, the S t i p u l a t i o n i t s e l f implies
that toe p e t i t i o n e r was not s t a b l e .
I t includes payment of the
ongoing medical care and physical therapy by Dxn Morgan
(Order
dated October 22, 2002, page 4.)
Furthermore,
impairment ratings do not equate to
stabilization as cJ aimea by respondents.
S t a b i l i t y i s defined by
the Utah 2002 Impairment Gundes, page 9 as,
MechcaJ stability (MMI) or f, :;ed slate of recovery, refers to a
date m whj ch the period of hcal.i.ng has ended and the sondiz^on of
the worker is not expected to materially improve or deteriorate by
mare tftsn 3^ Whole Person I D the ensuing yea^.
. .The date of
medical stability and the date when the workers qualifies for an
rumpa.:i_:rmcant irs-tn-i^g can be two separate dates .

(Emphasis

added)
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This definition and the separation of stabilization and
impairment: is taken directly from Booms v. Raoo 720 P2d 136 3
(Utah 1986), In Booms, the claimant argued that stopping payment
of temporary total benefits upon medical stabilization left him
with a "gap7' between the time he reached stabilization and the
time his permanent partial disability began. The Supreme Court
of Utah found this difference in the stabilization date and the
payment of impairment was appropriate and there is no requirement
that they occur on the same date.
Finally, I must admit to being confused by respondents claim
of a stipulated stabilization date. The current Stipulation of
Facts and Proposed Medical Panel Questions includes a complete
outline of petitioner's income from 1999 to 2004 so that
Temporary Partial Disability could be calculated if petitioner
was found not to be at MMI. (Stipulation of Fact and Proposed
Medical Panel Questions, pg 5.) Stabilization was a primary
issue in this case as reflected in the parties stipulated
Proposed Question #3, "3- If the fusion surgery is not
reasonable, has petitioner reached MMI?" I do not understand why
respondents would, now argue that we stipulated to a January 14,
2002 MMI date.
We respectfully request that the Medical Panel Report be
admitted into evidence.
It appears that TTD and TPD have not been paid correctly
throughout- this claim.
(Compare TTD paid, Stipulation page 3,
with the income chart, Stipulation pg 5.) Therefore, we request
an Order for Temporary Total Disability/Temporary Partial
Disability through MMI of June 10, 2004, less amounts actually
paid, plus 8% interest. I would be happy to prepare a chart of
these benefits if that would be helpful.
In addition, in accordance with the Medical Panel Report, we
request an Order for payment of medical care to date; immediate
approval of the recommended treatment of knee injections; and
payment of future medical care related to the treatment of the
l°w back and right knee, including the traumatic arthritis which
^a.y develop. We understand that based on the Medical Panel
Report, workers compensation, coverage for the stroke and cervical
injury will be denied.
Very truly yours,
ATKIN & ASSOCIATES,

"K. ll^^'Atkin, Esq.
C:

Amy Clausing
Theodore Kanell/Andrew Wadsworth
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December 1, 100 5
Theodore E. Kanell, Esq
Andrew Wadsworth, Esq.
PL^T, ViIALLACE, CHRISTENSEN k KANELL
136 South Temple STE 1700
Salt hake City, Utah 84111-1131

"/

Fie : Amty C1 ausing
Dear Ted and Andrew:
Judge Sessions entered the Order in this case on September
23; 2 005.
To date it has not been paid. I have computed the
TTD/TPD due, including credit for the benefits paid. My chart is
attached. Gary was nice enough to compute the interest for us.
His printout is attached as well.
lilt;
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simple interest at 8% for a total of $123,061.20.
Please note that PPD has been paid in full and is not
addressed in these computations.
Since it has been over 60 days since the Order, I was
preparing these numbers to request an abstract. However, "when I
realized how complicated the numbers were, I assumed you had not
yet had a chance to compute them. Therefore, I will delay any
action until Deceniloer 15th in the hope that we can get the check
issued before that date. Although our interest calculations end
as of December 1st, if the benefits are paid on or before
Dec ember iy~~, we 'will H O L re que SO aocii uionax interest.
Please let me know if I can assist you in interpreting these
charts, or provide additional information.
Very truly yours,
ATKIN & ASSOCIATES,

K. Dawfi' A t k i n ,
KDA/d
Enclosures
7- ,-on -

m^-nQ-i-nrr

Esq

Amy Clausing
ORDERED
March 1 8. ] 999 - June 10. 2004 at $487.00 per week
=272 Weeks at 487.00(max) per week
=$132,464 plus 8% interest
AMOUNTS PAID
TTD August 17. 200 to October 25, 2000 = $5,090.00
January 2, 2001 =$72.66
April 9, 200 - April 22, 2002 = $974.00
NOTE- DESPITE ORDER, CLIENT WORKED. TPD .
Wage rate is $900.00 per wsek/ TTD max is 487.00
E>ates/wages earned taken from Stipulation of Facts
3/18/99-5/7/99
7.28 Weeks %
$900 - 400 x 66.67% =$333.35

$2,426.79

5/8/99-12/29/99
33.71 weeks (a),
900-228X66.67%=$448.02

$15,102.75

12/30/99-1/10/00 TTD
1.71 Weeks @ $487

$832.77

1/11/00-2/28/00
7 weeks @
900-456 X66.67%=$296.01

$2,072.07

3/1/00-4/30/00
8.71 weeks@
900-228X66.67%=$448.02

$3,902.25

5/1/00-5/20/00
2.86 weeks@
900-45 6X66^67%=$296.01

$846.58

5/21//00-5/30/00 TTD
1.43 weeksfa) $487.00

$696.41

5/31/00-6/21/00
3 14 weeks @
900-456X66.67%=296.01

$929.47

6/22/00-6/28/00 TTD
] \veeksff/.'.$487

$487.00

6/20/00-8/16/00
7 vveeksi^'i
900-456X66.67%=$296.01

$2,072.07

8/17/00-] 0/25/00

$5,090.00 PAID

10/26/00-]/I/O 1
9.71 weeks @
900-456X66i>7%=$296.01
1/02/01

$2,874.26

$72.66 PAID

1/3/01-4/4/02
65.14 weeks@
900-456X66.67%=$296.01

$19,282.09

4/5/02-4/8/02 TTD
.57 weeks@.$487
4/9/02-4/22/02

$277.59
$974.00 PAID

4/23/02-5/30/02
5.43 weeks@
900-228X66.67%=$448.02
5/31/02-10/19/02
20.28 weeks@
900-456X66.67%=$296.01

$2,432.74

$6,003.08

1 0/20/02 to 5/4/03
28.14 weeks@
900-499.20X66.67%=$267.21

$7,519.28

5/5/03-2/28/04 TTD
42.86 weeksto!487

$20,872.82

3/1/04 to 5/25/04
12.28 weeks@
900-480X66.67%=$280.01

$3,438.52

5/26/04- 6/10/04 (MMI) TTD
2.28 weeks@487

$1,110.36
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±Jeai i_^avai
This lettei vnh seive to lespondto youi lettei and fa> of Decembei 1 2005 m which
von ontlined what yon felt w a s ""on1 client's claim foi tempoi a^-v total and teumoi an\ pai unl
disability payments You indicated that accoidmg to yom calculations $92,956 46 was owed
m compensation benefits, with anothei $30,104 76 owed mint ei est foi a total of S123 061 20
Aftei leviewmgyoui calculations and the pnoi oideis m this case I feel that youi
calculations aie in enoi As you aie awaie, youi client ongmalh filed a claim on Febiuaiy 9,
2001, m which she claimed entitlement to medical e>penses and tempoi ai^ total compensation
as the lesult of knee lnpuies with two Lnee sui genes as the lesult of the mdustnal incident on
Mai ch 18, 1999 Youi client v as iepi esented by Tim Allen in this fnst pi oceedmg On
Octobei 11,2001 Mi Allen, at youi client's dnection amended that application foi heaiing to
include the low bad injury and to claim entitlement to lecommended medical cai e and
pei manent imp an meat
Accoidmgl) at the time of heanng on Januaiy 14 2002, youi client's claims included
low bacl and 1 nee inpines as the i esult of the mdustnal incident on Mai ch 1 cc, 1909 and youi
client v as claiming entitlement to medical e penses i ecommended medical cai e, tempoi ai)
total compensation and peimanent impaiimeiit Piioi to the heanng 15 ] 62 uC haa been paid
to youi client foi tempoi ai) compensation benefits As you ai e aw ai e at heai nig on Januai y
14, 2002 youi client stipulated to a settlement which was menionahzed in an oidei enleiecl b\
TuJge Shaion Eblen on Octobei 22, 2002 Oui settlement agiecment on tins date lesolved all
issues pending at the heanng on Januai; 14 2002, winch included youi client s claim foi
tempoi ai y compensation i elated to hei 1 nee and lov bacl m]unes B) agieemg to settle hei
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claim at hearing, your client waived any further claim for additional temporary compensation
relating to her knee and low back, absent a change in condition
The only change with respect to your client's condition as related to the low back and
knee issues would be the third knee surgery which occurred on April 9, 2002, which was a
palliative hardware removal. Your client received $974.00 in temporary total compensation for
the period from the date of surgery on April 9, 2002 to April 22, 2002 Page 167 of the
Medical Record Exhibit indicates that your client was released to work as of April 18, 2002,
without restrictions to her hours. Accordingly, based on my review of the orders, medical
records, and your computations, there is no outstanding compensation to be paid, as your
client's neck condition has been found to be non-industrial.
If you have any questions, please give me a call.
Veiy truly yours,
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN &

TPIEODORE E KANELL
ANDREW M. WADSWORTH

AMW/mjw

KANELL

MAILING CERTIFICATE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that, on the /

day of April. 2007, two true and correct

copies of the foregoing and within Employee's Brief were deposited with the United States
mails, first class postage prepaid, and duly addressed for deliver}' to the following:

Theodore E. Kanell. Esq.
John H. Romney, Esq.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
Attorneys for Employer
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Allen L. Hennebold, Esq.
Utah Labor Commission
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600

